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INTRODUCTION
Cyber harassment is now commonly recognized as socially pervasive
and often severe in its harmful effects.1 Cyber harassment is sometimes
referred to by the relevant statues without any further description
beyond the listed elements of the offense. 2 But cyber harassment, as
addressed herein, also encompasses what the law refers to, more
specifically, as cyberbullying, 3 'revenge porn,' 4 some instances of cyber
invasion of privacy and 'sextortion,'5 cyberstalking, 6 and to 'true threats'
in the cyber realm.7
The case law addressing these forms of cyber harassment commonly,
but largely mistakenly, assumes a conflict between meaningfully
addressing the harms of cyber harassment and respecting the legitimate
* Copyright © 2020 R. George Wright. Lawrence A. Jegen Professor of Law,
Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law.
1 See infra notes 15-22 and accompanying text.
2 See infra notes 23-35 and accompanying text.
3 See infra notes 47-56 and accompanying text.
4 See infra notes 57-66 and accompanying text.
5 See infra notes 67-88 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 89-95 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 96-103 and accompanying text. These forms of cyber harassment
can of course overlap in any given case.
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free speech rights of cyber harassers. Judicial concerns over tradeoffs
between the rights or interests of the targets of cyber harassment on the
one hand, and free speech values on the other are, however, largely
misplaced. In many cyber harassment cases, the values thought to be
promoted by protecting speech are absent, or on balance actually
supportive of the rights or interests of the targets of cyber harassment.
This Article briefly introduces the phenomena of cyber harassment,
particularly as experienced by its targets.8 Cyber harassment, as broadly
understood herein, often involves substantial harms to its targets. The
pervasiveness and frequent severity of the harms of cyber harassment
have prompted the development of a complex regulatory network for
the various forms of cyber harassment.9 The legal regulation of cyber
harassment is, however, again often thought, largely mistakenly, to be
limited by the constitutional free speech interests of the cyber
harassers.10
As it turns out, the relationship between the interests of the targets of
cyber harassment and the scope and values of freedom of speech are
widely and fundamentally misunderstood. In most typical cases of cyber
harassment, the harassing language in question should not be classified
as speech, in the constitutionally relevant sense, at all.11 Simply put,
such literal speech does not implicate any of the consensually or
commonly cited basic reasons, values, or purposes underlying the
constitutional protection of speech. Such literal speech amounts to a
subcategory of speech that addresses matters of only personal interest
or concern, which is itself also logically undeserving of distinctive
constitutional free speech protection. 12
Ironically, this means that the attention deservedly paid to the severe
and pervasive harms of cyber harassment, as doubtless important as
they are, are largely irrelevant to the crucial constitutional question of
whether cyber harassment should be protected, to any degree, from
regulation based on free speech claims. In the typical absence of any
speech in the constitutional sense in the first place, prohibition of cyber
harassment actually should not require any showing of severe harm to
its targets.
There are, certainly, a class of judicial cases, 13 often involving youth
offenders, in which the cyber harasser has legally cognizable interests
8 See infra Part II.
9 See infra Part II.
10 See infra Parts II-III.
11 See infra Part III.
12 See infra Part IV.
13 See, e.g., the discussion infra at notes 24-34 and accompanying text.
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that argue against the imposition of criminal sanctions. But those
interests can normally be accommodated by some sort of appropriate
administrative, civil, or injunctive remedy, as distinct from a criminal
sanction.
Finally, there may also be a rare class of cases in which the cyber
harassment amounts to, or is at least inextricably entangled with, fully
constitutionally protected speech. 14 In this, but only this, narrow subset
of the cases, the courts should, under the currently dominant case law
principles, sensitively apply some form of strict judicial scrutiny to the
regulation, requiring both a compelling or overridingly important
public interest, and a narrow tailoring of the speech regulation to that
interest. The free speech interests of the targets of such harassment
should, however, therein also be accommodated.
Overall, then, a careful analysis suggests that in most cyber
harassment cases, free speech considerations are essentially absent. The
severity of the harms of cyber harassment, along with the hateful or
otherwise malicious state of mind of the literal speaker, thus actually do
not enter into the question of whether, given the Free Speech Clause,
cyber harassment can be reasonably regulated. Most cyber harassment
can thus make no claim to any free speech protection at all. And the
harms and the pervasiveness of cyber harassment are relevant only to
the character that the legal regulation of cyber harassment should take.
I. CYBER HARASSMENT AND THE CASE LAW
Cyber harassment has come to be recognized as a substantial social
problem. Perhaps four in ten Americans have experienced some form of
online harassment.15 A majority of surveyed American adults consider
14 For possible examples of this relatively rare category, see Coleman v. Razete, 137
N.E.3d 639, 641-42 (Ohio Ct. App. 2019) (combining both purely personal and broader
justice and alleged fraud claims); TM v. MZ, 926 N.W.2d 900, 904-06 (Mich. Ct. App.
2018) (similar).
15 See Monica Anderson, Key Takeaways on How Americans View - and Experience
- Online Harassment, PEW RES. CTR. (July 11, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2017/07/11/key-takeaways; MAEVE DUGGAN, ONLINE HARASSMENT 2017, at 3, PEW
RES. CTR. (2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/wp-content/uploads/sites/9/
2017/07/PI_2017.07.11 Online-HarassmentFINAL.pdf; see also State v. VanBuren,
214 A.3d 791, 795 (Vt. 2019) (citing data on an estimated ten million threats of or
actual non-consensual postings of explicit images).
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online harassment to constitute a major problem. 16 Women, in
particular, are disproportionately targeted by cyber harassment.1 7
Unlike most other forms of harassment, cyber media posts tend to
persist over time," and to be cheaply and easily re-disseminated to any
number of willing, or unwilling, recipients.19 A leading expert,
Professor Danielle Keats Citron, briefly summarizes the "devastating
impact" 20 of cyber harassment in these terms:
[Cyber harassment] trashes victims' professional reputations
and careers, discourages on- and offline pursuits, disrupts both
crucial and ordinary life choices, and causes physical and
emotional harm . . . . [C]yber harassment interferes with
victims' ability to take full advantage of the economic, political,
and social opportunities of our digital age.21
The case law clearly bears out these concerns. 22
Consider, though, an unusual recent appellate case in which the text
senders were female and the victim was male.23 Despite these and other
16 See DUGGAN, supra note 15, at 4. An even larger majority of survey respondents
want either the cyber technology firms and platforms or the government, or both, to
move to reduce the problems. See id.; Issie Lapowski, I in 3 Americans Suffered Severe
Online Harassment in 2018, WIRED (Feb. 13, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/
story/severe-online-harassment-2018-adl-survey. But cf. DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE
CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 254-55 (2014) (referring to "social attitudes that trivialize cyber
harassment").
17 See CITRON, supra note 16, at 13.
18 See id. at 4.
19 See id. at 29.
20 Id.
21 Id.; see also Mary Ann Franks, "Revenge Porn" Reform: A View from the Front Lines,
69 FLA. L. REV. 1251, 1261-69 (2017) (presenting survey data on targeted persons'
reactions and recounting several case histories). In general, focusing on the severity and
pervasiveness of cyber harassment harms is most useful in motivating legal and cultural
reform.
22 See infra Part II. Of course, serious harassment can take the form of more or less
direct personal contact or surveillance, as well as by telephone. See, e.g., United States
v. Waggy, 936 F.3d 1014, 1016-20 (9th Cir. 2019) (describing the defendant's
telephone speech and conduct in the context of discussing judicial issues of specific
intent); Ex parte Barton, 586 S.W.3d 573, 585 (Tex. App. 2019) (a computer text
messages and emails case, but discussing the case law of harassment via telephone calls
and ultimately holding a Texas statutory prohibition of sending "repeated electronic
communications in a manner reasonably likely to harass, annoy, alarm, abuse, torment,
embarrass, or offend another" to be unconstitutionally vague and overbroad). In Barton,
the recipient was the defendant's ex-spouse. See Barton, supra note 22, at 575-76.
23 See CITRON, supra note 16, at 13.
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quite atypical features, In re JP 24 repays sustained attention in some
important respects.
The JP case involved Snapchat group messaging among four sixth-
and seventh-grade girls. 25 Typically, Snapchat messages are more
ephemeral and limited in dissemination than many other forms of cyber
communication. 26 In this case, the girls "decided they did not like a 13-
year-old boy, and fantasized via group text messages [among
themselves] about killing him, his dog, and even his goldfish." 27 The
object of their animosity was not sent, was not intended to receive, did
not receive, 28 and never actually read, any of the texts in question. 29
One of the four girls, JP, was criminally charged under a Michigan
statute that forbids the sending of text messages "intended to 'terrorize,
frighten, intimidate, threaten, harass, molest, or annoy' another
person." 30 Finding no evidence of any relevant intent, the Michigan
Court of Appeals dismissed the order in the case.31 The court sensibly
viewed the texts in question as more suitably addressed by school
administration rules and policies than by criminal sanctions. 32
For free speech purposes, though, it is useful to consider the actual
character of the text-language conveyed within the four-member
Snapchat group in question. After all, any possible free speech interests
could be relevant to any potential public school administrative
discipline. 33 As it happens, the language of the texts in the JP case,
however patently adolescent, has much in common with the typical
language of many online harassment cases.
Among the relevant texts, with Snapchat names herein added and
with emojis and Bitmojis deleted, we have:
7UP: I WILL MARGARITA SQUARE UP LIKE [S']S HEAD
LADY GAGA: HAHAHAHAHHAHAGA
7UP: LETS GOOOOO
24 No. 344812, 2019 WL 4648450 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 24, 2019).







32 See id. at *2.
33 See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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LADY GAGA: WE SHOULD STAB HIM
DREAM RUINER: [EMOJIS]
7UP: YES ...
7UP: MURDER HIM LET'S DO IT
LADY GAGA: AND HIS FAMILY AND HIS DOG
7UP: YEEEESS
DREAM RUINER: MURDER HIM
LADY GAGA: AND HIS GOLDFISH
DREAM RUINER: XD
ME: What if he doesn't have a dog!!
7UP: WE WILL DRUG HIM THEN STAB HIM TO
DEATH . . . .34
The texts in question continued in this vein. 35
Again granting the unusual nature of the JP case in important
respects, it is important to bear in mind the general nature of the
language, in its context, at issue. The point, ultimately, will not be to
critique or to judge any language or any speaker. Rather, the point will
be to hold the actual character of all cyber-harassing language up to the
light of the commonly asserted reasons for constitutionally valuing
instances of speech in general. 36
As it turns out, much cyber-harassing language, as inJP, is speech in
some literal sense, but not speech in the sense of any aptness to
detectably embody or advance any of the typical reasons for
constitutionally enshrining speech. 37
The unavailability of any free speech claim on behalf of such literal
speech should not change if we treat such cases as involving merely
private or personal concerns among the persons involved.38 Speech on
34 JP, 2019 WL 4648450, at *1-2.
31 See id.
36 See infra Parts III-IV.
37 See id. Crucially, if cyber harassment is somehow thought to involve meaningful
autonomous self-realization by the harasser, then virtually any human behavior,
however pathological, destructive, or felonious, would become speech for
constitutional free speech purposes. This would obliterate any distinction between
speech and conduct and turn the Free Speech Clause into an utterly indeterminate 'free
behavior' clause. See infra notes 160-164 and accompanying text.
38 See infra Part IV.
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matters of merely private or personal concern is still, on our view,
unworthy of constitutional protection under the Free Speech Clause. 39
In the relatively few cyber harassment cases not classifiable as speech
on matters of private interest, the values relevant to speech will typically
appear on both sides of the case, and indeed most conspicuously on the
side not of the speaker-harasser, but on the side of the targets of cyber
harassment.4 0 In any further residue of the cyber harassment cases,
some form of strict scrutiny, appropriately sensitive to the interests at
stake, would normally be applied.41
If we analyze the cyber harassment cases broadly defined, we find that
such cases may refer more specifically to cyberbullying,42 to revenge
porn, 43 to invasions of privacy with those privacy rights being explicitly
39 See id.
40 See generally Gregory P. Magarian, Thejurisprudence of Colliding First Amendment
Interests: The Dead End of Neutrality to the Open Road of Participation-Enhancing Review,
83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 185 (2007). More specifically, a genuine free speech case will
involve basic free speech interests, including the values of promoting a market for truth,
democratic self-government, and personal autonomy or self-realization, normally on
both sides of the case. See R. George Wright, Why Free Speech Cases Are as Hard (and as
Easy) as They Are, 68 TENN. L. REV. 335, 336 (2001) [hereinafter Why Free Speech].
While all cyber harassers may be following their largely emotional impulses, they are
doing so without the consent of the targets of their harassment, who can hardly "just
avert their eyes," as in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971). See also Frisby v.
Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487 (1988) (captive home audience case).
41 For an example of the test applied, see Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218,
2226 (2015).
42 See, e.g., New York v. Marquan M., 19 N.E.3d 480 (N.Y. 2014); State v. Bishop,
787 S.E.2d 814 (N.C. 2016).
43 See, e.g., People v. Austin, No. 123910, 2019 WL 5287962 (Ill. Oct. 18, 2019);
Patel v. Hussain, 485 S.W.3d 153 (Tex. Ct. App. 2016); State v. VanBuren, 214 A.3d
791 (Vt. 2019); see also Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing
Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345, 346 (2014); Franks, supra note 21; Deanna
Paul, Is Revenge Porn Protected Speech? Lawyers Weigh In, and Hope for a Supreme Court
Ruling, WASH. POST (Dec. 26, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/
2019/12/26/is-revenge-porn-protected-speech-supreme-court-may-soon-weigh. For a
sense of the status of revenge porn as a cultural issue, see Maureen Dowd, Now Comes
the Naked Truth, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/02/
opinion/sunday/katie-hill-resigns-millennials-boomers.html.
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foregrounded, 44 to cyberstalking, 45 or to so-called 'true threat' cyber
harassment cases. 46 The nature of the literal speech of course varies to
some degree within each of these categories of cyber harassment.
Consider first the language and relevant context in the cyberbullying
case of People v. Marquan M. 47 In this case, the New York Court of
Appeals held an Albany County criminal cyberbullying statute
overbroad in several respects,48 applied strict scrutiny,49 and struck
down the regulation as facially invalid5o on free speech grounds.51 Our
concern is not, however, with the court's overbreadth analysis,52 or with
the result in the case. Overbreadth concerns are not ultimately
fundamental. Rather, our concern at this point is merely to note the
nature and context of the defendant's literal speech, which constitute
the basis of his constitutional free speech claim.
As recounted by the New York Court of Appeals,
Marquan M., a student attending Cohoes High School in Albany
County, used the social networking website "Facebook" to
44 See, e.g., Gilbreath v. State, 650 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 1995); Ex parte Lopez, No. 09-17-
00393-CR, 2019 WL 1905243 (Tex. Ct. App. Mar. 27, 2019) (not for publication). See
generally Danielle Keats Citron, Why Sexual Privacy Matters for Trust, 96 WASH. U. L.
REV. 1189, 1206-07 (2019) (on 'sextortion' in particular); Quinta Jurecic et al.,
Sextortion: The Problem and Solutions, BROOKINGS INST. (May 11, 2016),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2016/05/1 1/sextortion-the-problem-and-
solutions.
45 See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 905 F.3d 165 (3d Cir. 2018); United States v.
Conlan, 786 F.3d 380 (5th Cir. 2015); United States v. Sayer, 748 F.3d 425 (1st Cir.
2014); United States v. Petrovic, 701 F.3d 849 (8th Cir. 2012); United States v. Ackell,
No. 15-cr-123-01-JL, 2017 WL 2913452 (D.N.H. July 7, 2017) (not for publication);
United States v. Matusiewicz, 84 F. Supp. 3d 363 (D. Del. 2015); United States v.
Cassidy, 814 F. Supp. 2d 575 (D. Md. 2011); State v. Relerford, 104 N.E.3d 341 (Ill.
2017); In re A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d 840 (Minn. 2019); People v. Morocho, 132 N.E.3d 806
(Ill. App. Ct. 2019); State v. Shackelford, 825 S.E.2d 689 (N.C. Ct. App. 2019).
46 See, e.g., United States v. Khan, 937 F.3d 1042 (7th Cir. 2019); United States v.
Houston, 683 F. App'x 434 (6th Cir. 2017) (not for publication); United States v.
Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2011); State v. Crawford, No. 1-16-0184, 2019
WL 3416749 (Ill. App. Ct. July 25, 2019); State v. Khan, 127 N.E.3d 592 (Ill. App. Ct.
2018); McGuire v. State, 132 N.E.3d 438 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). For discussion, see
Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, #I-U: Considering the Context of Online Threats, 106 CALIF. L.
REV. 1885, 1888 (2018).
47 19 N.E.3d 480 (N.Y. 2014).




52 Classically, the implications of unconstitutional overbreadth are played out in
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521 (1972).
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create a page bearing the pseudonym "Cohoes Flame." He
anonymously posted photographs of high-school classmates
and other adolescents, with detailed descriptions of their
alleged sexual practices and predilections, sexual partners and
other types of personal information. The descriptive captions,
which were vulgar and offensive, prompted responsive
electronic messages that threatened the creator of the website
with physical harm. 53
The overbreadth doctrine is most at home in pragmatically
accommodating otherwise prohibitable instances of broadly political
speech that addresses some matter of public interest and concern.5 4 But
our main concern herein is again not with whether or how the
overbreadth doctrine should be applied in this case. Instead, the aim,
for the moment, is simply to bear in mind the above-described content
and context of all the defendant's literal speech in Marquan M.55 That
speech, along with other instances of literal speech in cyberspace, can
then be classified as outside of the scope of 'speech' for free speech
constitutional purposes, given the basic reasons for constitutionally
protecting speech, as described below.56
Similarly classifiable is the literal speech in typical 'revenge porn'5 7
cases. In one such case, Patel v. Hussain,58 the "appellee Nadia Hussain
sued appellant Akhil Patel, alleging that after the couple broke up, Patel
hounded her with a slew of offensive and threatening communications,
hacked or attempted to hack her [social media] accounts, and posted
secretly recorded sexual videos of Nadia on the Internet."5 9 There is in
53 Marquan M., 19 N.E.3d at 484.
54 See, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972) (Vietnam War era anti-war
protester arrest).
55 The New York Court of Appeals added that the defendant's literal speech
"identified specific adolescents with photographs, described their purported sexual
practices and posted the information on a website accessible world-wide ....
[D] efendant used the ... Internet to attack his victims from a safe distance, 24 hours a
day, while cloaked in anonymity." Marquan M., 19 N.E.3d at 488.
56 See infra Parts III-IV.
57 See Citron & Franks, supra note 43, at 346; Andrew Koppelman, Revenge
Pornography and First Amendment Exceptions, 65 EMORY LJ. 661, 690-92 (2016)
(focusing on expanding the scope of speech categories excepted from free speech
protection, as distinct from a concern as to what should count as speech, in the
constitutional sense, for free speech purposes in the first place).
5 485 S.W.3d 153 (Tex. Ct. App. 2016).
59 Id. at 157; see also State v. Casillas, 938 N.W.2d 74, 82 (Minn. Ct. App. 2019)
(applying overbreadth doctrine and focusing on an irremediable lack of a statutory
intent-to-harm requirement in striking down a revenge porn statute).
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this case, crucially, no suggestion of any intent, or any attempt, to
convey any sort of factual question or claim, opinion, message, or view
bearing, in the slightest, upon anything that could be claimed to be a
subject of any potential public interest or concern, 60 or to otherwise
implicate any basic free speech values.
Thus classifiable as well is the literal speech in the typical revenge
porn case of State v. VanBuren.61 According to the arresting police officer
in the case,
[c]omplainant contacted police after she discovered that
someone had posted naked pictures of her on a Facebook
account belonging to Anthony Coon and 'tagged' her in the
picture. Complainant called Mr. Coon and ... ask[ed] that the
pictures be deleted. Shortly thereafter, defendant called
complainant back on Mr. Coon's phone; she called complainant
a "moraless [sic] pig" and told her that she was going to contact
complainant's employer, a child care facility. When
complainant asked defendant to remove the pictures, defendant
responded that she was going to ruin complainant and get
revenge.62
As it happened, the court in VanBuren accorded "full First
Amendment protection" 63 to this revenge porn, but then determined
that the Vermont statute criminalizing revenge porn survived strict
scrutiny.64 Again, the actual disposition of this case is not of central
concern. Our focus is instead on the actual character and context of the
posted image. The court's characterizing this particular image posting
as fully protected speech, with the content-based regulation thereof
then being subject to strict scrutiny, 65 illustrates a much broader
jurisprudential problem discussed below.66 There is simply no
functional or purposive reason for classifying this image posting as
within the scope of 'speech' for free speech constitutional purposes.
60 For discussion, see infra Part IV.
61 214 A.3d 791 (Vt. 2019).
62 Id. at 796.
63 See id. at 800.
64 See id. The court applied a test of strict scrutiny while explicitly recognizing that
the relevant Vermont statute exempts all speech that is on a matter of public interest
and concern. See id. at 810.
65 See id. at 800.
66 See infra Parts III-IV.
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Some cyber harassment cases also choose to explicitly emphasize the
privacy-related dimensions 67 of the literal speech or imagery in
question. In a recent case, 68 the defendant was charged with the
"unlawful disclosure or promotion of intimate visual material." 69 This
offense requires, among other considerations, lack of consent by the
depicted person, 70 defined intimate exposure, 71 a reasonable
expectation of privacy,72 harm to the depicted person,73 and a revelation
of the identity of that depicted person. 74 As is typical, the image under
the statute need not qualify as legally obscene75 and for that narrow
reason as unprotected under the Free Speech Clause.76
In this instance, the criminal information alleged that the defendant,
"without the ... consent of [the complainant], intentionally disclose[d]
visual material, namely, photographs, depicting the complainant 'with
her buttocks exposed' . . . ."77 As in the VanBuren revenge porn case,78
the court rejected a claim of substantial statutory overbreadth, 79 applied
strict scrutiny in requiring a compelling governmental interest and
narrow statutory tailoring to that interest,8 0 and upheld the statute
under this rigorous free speech test.81
Curiously, and again as in VanBuren,82 the court imposed a rigorous
strict scrutiny test83 to the regulation in question despite an apparent
awareness of the minimal, or more precisely, non-existent free speech
values at stake.84 The court recognized the absence of any statutory
67 See generally Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890); William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960).
68 Exparte Lopez, No. 09-17-00393-CR, 2019 WL 1905243 (Tex. Ct. App. Mar. 27,
2019) (not for publication).






75 See generally Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
76 See id. at 23.
77 Ex parte Lopez, No. 09-17-00393-CR, 2019 WL 1905243, at *1 (second brackets
added).
78 See supra text accompanying notes 61-65.
79 See Lopez, 2019 WL 1905243, at *5.
80 See id.
81 See id.
82 See supra note 64.
83 See Lopez, 2019 WL 1905243, at *5.
84 See id.
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threat to uninhibited discussion of any public issue,85 to any meaningful
exchange of ideas, 86 and to pursuit of truth in particular.87 Given these
entirely reasonable judicial conclusions, it is natural to wonder why, at
a very minimum, the regulation at issue should be tested by strict
scrutiny.88
Similar concerns arise with respect to the cases decided under the
rubric of 'cyberstalking.' 89 As with other forms of cyber harassment,
cyberstalking speech is not constitutionally protected if that speech can
be shown to be integral to some other independently criminal conduct
of any sort.90 Here, we are of course interested in the nature and speech
value of cyberstalking speech in itself, independent of any related,
uncontroversially criminal activity.
As one might imagine, the circumstances prompting charges of
cyberstalking vary widely.91 But the following case scenario is hardly
unique. Consider an excerpt from the cyberstalking case of United States
v. Conian.92 In Conlan, after receiving unequivocal social rejections,93
the defendant
then began an escalating, year-long campaign of email, text-
message, social-media, telephonic, and face-to-face contact with
JMP, her family, work colleagues, and church members. Many
of the messages were hateful, threatening, and graphically
sexual .... He told her that "things would get worse" and asked
her to "send [him] a pretty picture once a week, that would keep
[him] under control . . . . He also sent her a single-line email





89 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 45.
90 See generally Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949)
(regarding speech that is intended to motivate its audience to violate criminal antitrust
laws); United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 471 (2010); United States v. Gonzalez,
905 F.3d 165, 192 (3d Cir. 2018) (cyberstalking speech both defamatory and integral
to independently criminal activity); Commonwealth v. Carter, 115 N.E.3d 559, 570
(Mass. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 910 (2020) (tragic involuntary manslaughter via
allegedly inducing a suicide).
91 See cases cited supra note 45.
92 786 F.3d 380 (5th Cir. 2015).
93 See id. at 384.
94 Id.
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The cyberstalking cases are often decided through focusing on issues
of required intent, vagueness, and overbreadth.9 5 Our concern,
however, is that free speech-based considerations should be addressed
only to the extent that 'speech' for constitutional purposes is actually
present in the case.
As a final sub-category 96 among the broad range of cyber harassment
cases, consider the cyber-based 'true threat' case law.97 The most
familiar non-cyber true threat cases involve a recognizable element of
political or social speech.98 But the cyber harassment cases may or may
not implicate any basic free speech values, or any political or other
public concern, or any attempt to address any such matter.
Consider, for example, the recent 'true threat' case of People v.
Crawford.99 The court in Crawford summarized some crucial evidence
by concluding that
Defendant sent Seiler several text messages . . . . [D]efendant's
text messages stated: "U GONE DIE;" "I WILL F*** MURDER
U". . . "Don't give a f*** who u tell. .. ." "GET READY TO
MEET YOUR MAKER" .... Its not a matter of 'if I catch u but
'when' and when I do uts [sic] gone be ugly and im already
prepared to go *** jail for doing it." 100
It is certainly true that 'true threat' cases may be complicated by, for
example, issues of the statutorily necessary intent,10 1 claims of mere
hyperbole, or questions of the value of posting explicit disclaimers. 102
95 See id.; State v. Relerford, 104 N.E.3d 341, 353-57 (Ill. 2017); People v. Morocho,
132 N.E.3d 806, 814 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019); United States v. Ackell, No. 15-cr-123-01-JL,
2017 WL 2913452, at *1 (D.N.H. July 7, 2017) (not for publication); see also State v.
Crawford, No. 1-16-0184, 2019 WL 3416749 (Ill. App. Ct. July 25, 2019) (discussing
overbreadth in a cyberstalking and 'true threat' case).
96 Plainly, the various categories of cyber harassment cases are often more
overlapping than they are separate and discrete.
97 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 46.
98 See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (per curiam) (Vietnam War era
military draft case); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (cross burning case
referring broadly to threats "where the speaker means to communicate a serious
expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual
or group of individuals"). For a mixed political and non-political cyber threat case, see
United States v. Khan, 937 F.3d 1042, 1046-47 (7th Cir. 2019).
99 No. 1-16-0184, 2019 WL 3416749 (Ill. App. Ct. July 25, 2019).
100 Id. at *1 (asterisks in the original) (in addition to two overheard telephone death
threats).
101 For a partly inconclusive discussion, see Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001,
2009-12 (2015).
102 For various permutations of this, see, e.g., cases cited supra note 46.
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But lack of sufficient intent, the presence of hyperbole, and the
presence of disclaimers do not add to the perhaps nonexistent
constitutional speech value of the threats at issue. Nor do these
considerations convert speech on matters of merely personal or private
interest into speech on a subject of public interest or concern. Roughly
put, announcing in a disclaimer that one's literal speech should not be
taken seriously, or should not be taken as seriously as a reader otherwise
might, does not add to that speech's First Amendment value. 103
Overall, then, in many of the cyber harassment cases, regardless of
type, the language of the harasser, in its context, does not seem worthy,
on free speech grounds, of constitutionally shielding that harasser from
any otherwise fully appropriate legal response. This result is not a
matter of anyone's agreeing or disagreeing with any assertion of fact or
opinion by the harasser. Immediately below, we consider more
fundamentally why harassing language of the sort illustratively quoted
above should not count, at all, as cognizable 'speech' for constitutional
free speech purposes.
II. CYBER-HARASSING SPEECH AS COMMONLY NON-SPEECH FOR FIRST
AMENDMENT PURPOSES
The scope of what counts as speech, for First Amendment purposes,
must have some limits. Otherwise, the Free Speech Clause would
amount to an internally contradictory charter of some sort of universal
behavioral libertarianism. For our purposes, though, no detailed theory
of precisely what should count as 'speech' for First Amendment
purposes is necessary.104 For our purposes, all communication
technologies can be accepted as transmitters of speech. And even some
speech that is intended to be purely artistic and even, in some sense,
unintelligible, can herein count as 'speech' within the scope of the First
Amendment.105
103 But for very useful qualifications, see generally the exceptionally valuable ARTHUR
M. MELZER, PHILOSOPHY BETWEEN THE LINES: THE LOST HISTORY OF ESOTERIC WRITING
(2014).
104 See generally R. George Wright, What Counts as Speech in the First Place? , 37
PEPP. L. REV. 1217 (2010) [hereinafter What Counts as Speech].
105 See MARK V. TUSHNET, ALAN K. CHEN & JOSEPH BLOCHER, FREE SPEECH BEYOND
WORDS: THE SURPRISING REACH OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1, 4 (2017); Enrique Armijo,
The Freedom of Non-Speech, 33 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 294 (2018) (on Lewis Carroll's
'nonsense' poem jabberwocky). For background, see generally Frederick Schauer, The
Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience,
117 HARV. L. REV. 1765 (2004).
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Certainly, not all instances of cyber harassment can be
uncontroversially disqualified as either legally obscene 106 or as
prohibitable 'fighting words,' in the sense of words that "by their very
utterance inflict injury."10 7 Cyber harassment need not even involve
sexually explicit language, short of obscenity. And cyber harassment
need not inflict immediate injury, at least to the ultimate target, where
the actual recipient of the harassing message is a neighbor, business
associate, or potential employer of the targeted person.108
It is still possible, however, to draw sensible judicial lines recognizing
that much cyber-harassing literal speech simply should not count as
'speech' at all within the meaning of the First Amendment. And these
lines should be manageable without any official assessment of the
worth, legitimacy, justifiability, or fitness of any idea or viewpoint
offered or entailed by the literal speech in question. 109
As it turns out, some case law already recognizes a reasonably
manageable distinction between literal speech that falls within the scope
of the First Amendment coverage, and literal speech that does not, quite
apart from any categorical or subject matter exceptions to freedom of
speech for the kind of literal speech in question. 110
Thus, outside the harassment context, cyber or otherwise, consider
the opinion of Judge Richard Posner in the case of Swank v. Smart.111
Swank involved a police officer employee discharge case in which the
terminated officer raised a free speech claim. 112 Judge Posner in Swank
recognized the officer's need, under the public employee speech
106 See generally Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 18 (1973) (material sent via mails
to unconsenting and largely unknown recipients).
107 See the first and typically underutilized prong of the misleadingly named 'fighting
words' exception to free speech in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72
(1942), and the relevant hopeful discussion in Franks, supra note 21, at 1315. For a
non-cyber case of direct harassment, see the vulgar public argument case of Kansas v.
Hamilton, No. 120729, 2019 WL 6223352 at *3 (Kan. Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2019) (not for
publication).
108 We may here treat as an 'utterance' either the single act of sending a 'message' to
one or many recipients, or the receipt and opening of the 'message' by any recipient.
109 Perhaps the single greatest fear underlying the free speech case law is of a
government's penalizing or prohibiting disfavored messages in light of the government's
or anyone else's fear or dislike of the ideas, viewpoint, or critical perspective expressed
by that message. See generally Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015).
110 For a controversial such discussion, see United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460,
468-72 (2010) (federal statutory animal "crush video" case).
111 Smart v. Swank, 898 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir. 1990).
112 See id. at 1250.
201
UC Davis Law Review Online
discipline cases, 113 to show that the speech by the officer rose to the
level of addressing some matter of public interest or concern.114
Fascinatingly, though, Judge Posner in Swank sensibly undertook an
analysis of the logic of constitutionally protecting free speech more
fundamental than a mere reliance on the distinctive requirements of the
public employee speech discipline cases. 115 Much more broadly, Judge
Posner looked to the idea of basic purpose and function underlying any
distinctive constitutional protection for speech.
At this more basic level, Judge Posner argued that
The purpose of the free-speech clause . . . is to protect the
market in ideas . .. broadly understood as the public expression
of ideas, narratives, concepts, imagery, opinions - scientific,
political, or aesthetic - to an audience whom the speaker seeks
to inform, edify, or entertain. 116
Thus, as merely one implication, "[c]asual chit-chat between two
persons or otherwise confined to a small social group is unrelated, or
largely so, to that marketplace, and is not protected." 117 Given that
Swank itself involved just such casual chit-chat," 8 Judge Posner had no
occasion to consider the broader implications of his logic.
Judge Posner did not deny that the literal speech at issue in Swank
was "important to its participants." 119 But importance in this sense does
not imply the relevance of such speech, whatever its specific subject
matter or perspectives thereon, to any attempt at "the advancement of
knowledge, the transformation of taste, political change, [or] cultural
expression." 120 And these dimensions of cultural life are, Judge Posner
observes, illustrative, if not exhaustive, of the "objectives, values, and
consequences of the speech that is protected by the First
Amendment." 121
113 See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142-49 (1983).
114 See Swank, 898 F.2d at 1251. For further discussion of the possibility of
extending the logic of the public employee speech discipline cases, with their
requirement for speech on a matter of public concern, to the cyber harassment cases,
see infra Part IV.
115 See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). For a discussion of the 'public
concern' case law, see infra Part IV.
116 Swank, 898 F.2d at 1250-51.
117 Id. at 1251.
118 See id. at 1249-50.
119 Id. at 1251.
120 Id.
121 Id. For affirmative citations of judge Posner's exclusion of "casual chit-chat" from
the scope of possible free speech protection, see Trejo v. Shoben, 319 F.3d 878, 887 (7th
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Judge Posner's basic value approach is arguably too narrow in that he
takes fostering a marketplace of ideas to exhaust all of the basic aims,
purposes, or values underlying constitutional protection for speech. 122
There are other entirely plausible candidates for the status of basic
values underlying freedom of speech, including meaningful democratic
self-government1 23 and promoting autonomy, self-realization, or self-
fulfillment. 124 For our purposes, it is better to possibly err on the side
of inclusiveness by recognizing all of the most commonly cited values
that are thought to justify constitutional protection for speech. 125
The basic intuition, though, that the constitutional enshrinement of
speech should serve one or more purposes or values is entirely sensible.
Any other approach would leave utterly mysterious why speech should
sometimes be protected when there are meaningful personal and social
costs in doing so. Not surprisingly, then, protecting speech is typically
linked, directly or indirectly, to promoting one or more free speech
purposes or values. 126
This is not to suggest that courts should decide free speech cases, even
in part, by referring directly and immediately to any basic underlying
Cir. 2003) (involving some arguably harassing, though not cyber-harassing, speech as
well); Miller v. Cooper, 116 F. Supp. 3d 919, 930 (W.D. Wis. 2015).
122 See supra notes 116-117 and accompanying text.
123 See generally ALEXANDER MEIKELJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT (1948); Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems, 47 IND. LJ. 1 (1971).
124 See, e.g., C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1989); MARTIN
REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1984); Brian C. Murchison, Speech and the Self-
Realization Value, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 443 (1998); see also sources cited infra
notes 160-164.
125 For useful taxonomies and critiques of commonly endorsed values thought to
underlie free speech protection, see, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A
PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY (1982); Thomas Emerson, Towards a General Theory of the First
Amendment, 72 YALE LJ. 877 (1963); Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 119 (1989); Alexander Tsesis, Free Speech Constitutionalism, 2015 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1015 (2015).
126 For defenses of value-based - or very broadly functionalist - approaches, see,
e.g., Leslie Kendrick, Use Your Words: On the "Speech" in "Freedom of Speech," 116 MICH.
L. REV. 667, 672 (2018) ("IS] ome value beyond speech itself is the reason that speech
is important."); Genevieve Lakier, The Invention of Low-Value Speech, 128 HARV. L. REV.
2166, 2169 (2015) (recognizing "the goals traditionally associated with the First
Amendment," and arguing that "the Court should ... recognize the purpose-driven and
functionalist, rather than historical, nature of the distinction between high- and low-
value speech" in particular); Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47
STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1255 (1995) ("First Amendment analysis is relevant only when the
values served by the First Amendment are implicated."); Schauer, supra note 105, at
1778 n.55 (2004) (quoting Post, supra note 126).
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free speech values that may or may not be at stake in the case. 127 There
is a place for useful "middle-range" judicial tests as well. 128 But failing
to require, at any point, some sufficient linkage between case law tests
or outcomes and the underlying reasons for according any special status
to speech in the first place involves judicial arbitrariness at best. 129
On reflection, no sufficiently meaningful such linkage exists, at any
level, between typical cyber harassment cases, such as those discussed
above, 130 and the most plausible candidates for the values sufficient to
explain and justify any constitutional free speech protection. 131
Commonly, cyber harassment case incidents cannot reasonably be
thought of even as attempts, successful or not, to engage in speech that,
in context, even minimally implicates or advances any of the above basic
reasons for constitutionally protecting speech in the first place. In fact,
a stronger case can be made, in many instances, that regulating the cyber
harassment at stake in the case would actually advance at least one
recognizable free speech value, given in particular the interest of cyber
harassment targets in their own autonomous self-realization. 132
More specifically, in typical cases, and certainly in those cases
surveyed above, 133 considerations such as a marketplace of ideas,
democratic self-government and related democracy-enhancing
concerns, and the value of one's full and autonomous self-actualization
are notably absent, where they do not actually cut in favor of the target
of the harassment. Recall, in particular, representative samplings of the
literal speech in the cases cited above.
In particular, consider the language in JP134: "I WILL MARGARITA
SQUARE UP LIKE[S']S HEAD." 135 Or the language in Marquan M 13 6:
"He anonymously posted photographs of high-school classmates and
127 See Wright, What Counts as Speech, supra note 104, at 1232 (citing Wright, Why
Free Speech, supra note 40).
128 See sources cited supra note 127.
129 See id.
130 See reported language and descriptions thereof supra Part II.
131 For compendia thereof, see the authorities cited supra notes 123-125. For brief
discussion along these lines addressing typical verbal harassment, but not cyber
harassment, cases, see Wright, What Counts as Speech, supra note 104, at 1255 (citing
State v. Brown, 85 P.3d 109, 112 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004) (quoting Thorne v. Bailey, 846
F.2d 241, 243 (4th Cir. 1988))).
132 See generally sources cited supra note 124.
133 See cases cited supra notes 106-131 & infra notes 135-149.
134 See supra notes 24-35 and accompanying text.
135 In re JP, No. 344812, 2019 WL 4648450, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 24, 2019);
see supra text accompanying note 34.
136 See supra notes 47-56 and accompanying text.
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other adolescents, with detailed descriptions of their alleged sexual
practices and predilections, sexual partners, and other types of personal
information."137 Or the description in Patel1 38 : "Patel hounded her with
a slew of offensive and threatening communications, hacked or
attempted to hack her accounts, and posted secretly recorded sexual
videos of Nadia on the Internet." 139 Or the account in VanBuren1 40:
"Complainant contacted police after she discovered that someone had
posted naked pictures of her on a Facebook account belonging to
Anthony Coon and 'tagged' her in the picture." 141 Or the report in
Conlan1 42 that the defendant "sent [the targeted party] a single-line e-
mail reciting her home address and repeatedly [telling] her to kill
herself." 143 Or, finally, the language in the Crawford144 case, in which
"defendant sent Seiler text messages that "U GONE DIE"; "I WILL F***
MURER YOU"; "Don't give a f*** who you tell. . . ."145
Without attempting to pass judgment on any of the parties to these
cases, and, crucially, before taking into account the gravity and
pervasiveness of the various harms of cyber harassment, we can largely
set aside the concern that " [e]ven if cyber harassment contributes little
to free speech value, 146 its regulation must comport with First
Amendment doctrine."147 If none of the basic values and purposes are
meaningfully at stake in the above and many similar cases, as they
clearly are not, there is no point to invoking constitutional free speech
protection in the first place.
137 People v. Marquan M., 19 N.E.3d 480, 484 (N.Y. 2014); see supra text
accompanying note 53.
138 See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
139 Patel v. Hussain, 485 S.W.3d 153, 157 (Tex. Ct. App. 2016); see supra text
accompanying note 59.
140 See supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
141 State v. VanBuren, 214 A.3d 791, 796 (Vt. 2019); see supra text accompanying
note 62; see also supra text accompanying note 77.
142 See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
143 United States v. Conlan, 786 F.3d 380, 384 (5th Cir. 2015); see supra text
accompanying note 74.
144 See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
145 People v. Crawford, No. 1-16-0184, 2019 WL 3416749, at *1 (111. App. Ct. July
25, 2019); see supra text accompanying note 100.
146 For Professor Citron's discussion, see Citron, supra note 16, at 193-99.
147 Id. at 199 (going on to discuss, inter alia, strict scrutiny of the regulation of
hateful speech). See also the multi-stage free speech analysis in Franks, supra note 21,
at 1312 (revenge porn as potentially either unprotected, minimally protected, or else
either surviving or not surviving a more rigorous strict scrutiny test of the speech
regulation).
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The serious trap to avoid in this context is one of interpreting typical
cyber-harassing language as intending to convey, however
inarticulately, some broad, generalized theory, however detestable, of
gender roles, dominance hierarchies, patriarchalism, or the legitimacy
of cultural violence. Instances of cyber harassment are indeed among
the various raw materials from which social theory can, in part, be
constructed and tested. But contributions to social theory are neither
intended by the typical cyber harassers, nor perceived by the typical
target of cyber harassment. Cyber harassers are not, more specifically,
seeking to contribute, as interlocutors, to any ongoing social discussion
or debate.
It may be tempting to instead read broad social theory claims into
obviously intensely personal cyber harassment. But cyber harassment
cannot ordinarily be realistically interpreted as genuinely attempting to
convey any interesting broader claim or proposition. Confusion in this
respect may arise because thoughtful observers are provoked, or
inspired, by cyber harassment to themselves construct descriptive or
normative social theories to account for such phenomena. But we can
be equally inspired by, for example, an earthquake, a storm at sea, or by
a sunset to articulate our own general thoughts about the sublime and
the beautiful. 148 But earthquakes do not intend any such message.
Nothing like our own articulate reactive thoughts is even vaguely
present in the natural phenomena themselves.
The serious harm of mistakenly investing typical cyber harassment
with a broader intended social message implicating free speech values
is that of unnecessarily and inappropriately shielding ordinary cyber
harassment with the armor of the Free Speech Clause. Nor, running the
argument in the other direction, do we honor the importance of
freedom of speech by pretending that genuine free speech issues are
present in cases where they are not.149
148 See, e.g., EDMUND BURKE, A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY INTO THE ORIGINS OF OUR IDEAS
OF THE SUBLIME AND THE BEAUTIFUL (Oxford Univ. Press rev. ed. 2015) (1757); IMMANUEL
KANT, OBSERVATIONS ON THE FEELING OF THE BEAUTIFUL AND THE SUBLIME AND OTHER
WRITINGS (Patrick Frierson & Paul Guyer eds., 2011) (1765). By analogy, we may be
provoked to think about, say, class-based patriarchalism by one person's vulgar epithet
addressed to an ex-spouse. But the speaker in such a case is typically not intending to
convey any such broader implication. Nor does the typical target of such harassment
react, meaningfully and primarily, at that broad social propositional level.
149 For an argument in favor of protecting speech-trivial commercial trademarks for
the sake of underlining the general seriousness of freedom of speech, see National
Review, Inc. v. Mann, 140 S. Ct. 344, 346-48 (2019) (Alito, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari). There is a difference between sensibly applying free speech principles, and
mechanically applying free speech principles where they are insufficiently relevant. The
206 [Vol. 53:187
2020] Cyber Harassment and the Scope of Freedom of Speech
Much cyber harassment thus involves speech in some literal sense,
but not speech in the crucial free speech constitutional sense, for failure
of such harassment to meaningfully implicate any of the basic reasons
for specially protecting speech in the first place. As it turns out, though,
there is another way of reaching this conclusion that draws upon two
converging streams of free speech law, as we briefly consider below.
III. TYPICAL CYBER HARASSMENT AS NOT ATTEMPTING TO ADDRESS
ANY MATTER OF PUBLIC INTEREST OR CONCERN
For a number of years, the Supreme Court has drawn a significant
distinction, in two separate contexts, 150 between speech that addresses
a matter of public interest or concern, and speech that addresses a
matter of only private or personal interest or concern. 151 Based on the
cyber harassment case law we have considered, it is sensible to say that
most cyber harassment speech would naturally be classified as speech
on a subject matter of only private or personal interest. And the Court
has indeed linked the distinction between public and merely private
interest speech to the basic purposes and values underlying the
constitutional protection of speech. 152
The problem here, though, is that the Court has over time been flatly
inconsistent on how much, if any, constitutional protection speech on
latter judicial course tends, one might imagine, toward an eventual broad dilution, and
confusion, of free speech standards.
150 Some of the relevant such cases involve free speech limitations on the state tort
law of libel. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749,
758-61 (1983) (plurality opinion). A greater number of such cases, however, involve
possible free speech limits on the ability of government employers to discipline their
public employees for reasons related to the latter's speech. See, e.g., Pickering v. Bd. of
Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 571-72 (1968).
151 For background and for a way to helpfully address borderline cases, which turn
out to be relatively rare in the cyber harassment area, see generally R. George Wright,
Speech on Matters of Public Interest and Concern, 37 DEPAUL L. REV. 27 (1987). Speech
that is clearly on a matter of public interest may have both public-spirited and personal
motives. See Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Camden, 842 F.3d 231, 243 (3d Cir.
2016).
152 See, e.g., Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 235-36 (2014) (referring to the free speech
purpose of assuring the "unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of
political and social changes desired by the people"); Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443,
451-52 (2011) (referring to the value of public debate on public issues, self-government,
and "a meaningful dialogue of ideas"); Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 758-59 (again
citing "the unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social
changes desired by the people," as echoed in Franks, 573 U.S. 228); Connick v. Myers,
461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983) (" [F]ree and open debate is vital to informed decision-making
by the electorate." (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571-72)).
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matters of merely private or personal interest or concern should receive.
In some cases, the Court has suggested that such speech has little to no
meaningful relationship to the basic reasons for protecting speech, and
thus logically deserves no distinctive free speech protection. 153 But in
other cases, the Court backs away from this sensible inference, and
accords some only vaguely specified, but limited, free speech protection
to speech on matters of merely personal interest. 154
153 See, e.g., Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 136 S. Ct. 1412, 1417 (2016) ("I]f the
employee has not engaged in what can 'be fairly characterized as constituting speech on
a matter of public concern, it is unnecessary for us to scrutinize the reasons for her
discharge."' (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 146)); Harris v. Quinn, 573 U.S. 616, 653
(2014) (under Pickering, 391 U.S. 563, "employee speech is unprotected if it is not on
a matter of 'public concern"'); Engquist v. Or. Dep't of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 600 (2008)
(noting "the First Amendment protects public employee speech only when it falls
within the core of First Amendment protection- speech on matters of public concern,"
but then adding vague, rarely relevant qualifications); Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S.
410, 418 (2006) (failure of the public employee to speak as a citizen on a subject of
public concern leaves that employee with "no First Amendment cause of action based
on his or her employer's reaction to the speech"); Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518
U.S. 668, 675 (1996) (briefly characterizing Connick, 461 U.S. 138, as holding that
"speech on merely private employment matters is unprotected"); Waters v. Churchill,
511 U.S 661, 668 (1994) ("To be protected, the speech must be on a matter of public
concern. . . .").
154 E.g., Franks, 573 U.S. at 235 (noting "[s]peech by citizens on matters of public
concern lies at the heart of the First Amendment," thereby implicitly suggesting that
some degree of free speech protection may be available beyond the center, core, or heart
of the Free Speech Clause); Snyder, 562 U.S. at 451-52 (same); Engquist, 553 U.S. at 600
(ultimately conceding only "wide latitude" to the public employer, and referring to "the
most unusual circumstances"); Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 774
(1986) (referring specifically to "the reduced constitutional value of speech involving
no matters of public concern" (emphasis added)); Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 761
(similarly referring to "the reduced constitutional value of speech involving no matters
of public concern" (emphasis added)); Rowland v. Mad River Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009,
1012 (1985) (public employee speech that is unrelated to matters of public concern as
unprotected "absent the most unusual circumstances" (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at
147)); see id. at 1013; Connick, 461 U.S. 147 ("We do not suggest ... that [public
employee] Myers' speech, even if not touching upon a matter of public concern, is
totally beyond the protection of the First Amendment."); see also Dun & Bradstreet, 472
U.S. at 759 (while speech on matters of public interest is on "the highest rung" of the
free speech protection hierarchy, and is therefore entitled to "special" free speech
protection, "speech on matters of purely private concern is of less [but presumably not
zero] First Amendment concern" (emphasis added)); id. at 760 (free speech protection
for speech on matters of merely private concern); State v. Culver, 918 N.W.2d 103, 110-
11 (Wis. 2018) (citing the basic free speech value discussion in Snyder, 562 U.S. at 452,
as well as Franks, supra note 21, at 1339 (on the Court's "heart" versus "lesser
protected" distinction)) ("When purely private matters are the subject at hand, free
speech protections are less rigorous .... .").
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Given this ongoing ambivalence and irresolution on the part of the
Court, it is certainly open to argue, with straightforward logic, that most
cyber harassment amounts to speech merely on matters of personal or
private interest, that such speech has been seen 55 to not significantly
implicate the basic reasons for constitutionally protecting speech in the
first place, and that such cyber harassment thus deserves no free speech
protection.
The ongoing judicial inconsistency regarding speech on matters of
merely personal concern may reflect, in part, the Court's quite
reasonable sense that there is a legally relevant distinction between, on
the one hand, idle chit-chat or mere personal grievances, and, on the
other hand, literal speech that is classifiable as obscene, or as inherently
prohibitable speech in the form of perjury, extortion, blackmail, or bank
robbery. 156 Doubtless such distinctions are often worth drawing.
The crucial difference, though, between, say, personal jabbering and
a kidnapping ransom note has to do with the nature and magnitude of
the harms that are typically involved. Personal jabbering typically does
not involve social harms worth prohibiting. In contrast, most ransom
note speech involves harms that are clearly more deserving of legal
regulation.
But these differences in the magnitudes of the social costs of these
two general types of literal speech do not also mean that personal chit-
chat and mere personal grievance speech tends to promote the basic
values or purposes of free speech more than, say, ransom note speech.
Neither, in fact, does cyber harassment. And specifically, typical
instances of cyber harassment are, in terms of their commonly imposed
social costs, far closer to ransom note speech than to consensual chit-
chat, while similarly not promoting any basic free speech purposes.
The ongoing judicial tendency to overextend free speech coverage to
cover typical cyber harassment cases may also reflect a much broader
tendency to err on the side of inclusion in free speech cases. There can
be a sense that it is more important to protect unconventional and
outcast literal speakers than to minimize the possibility of any
unintended judicial diluting of legitimate free speech protection more
generally, or of losing focus on the competing interests actually at stake
in free speech cases. If so, the Court's occasional gestures at protecting
155 See supra Part III. See also the interstate cyber harassment case of United States v.
Osinger, 753 F.3d 939, 948 (9th Cir. 2014) ("IT] he public has no legitimate interest in
the private sexual activities of [the victim] or in the embarrassing facts revealed about
her life . . . ." (quoting United States v. Petrovic, 701 F.3d 849, 856 (8th Cir. 2012))).
156 For a contrast between speech on merely personal matters and legally obscene
speech, see Connick, 461 U.S. at 147.
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mere personal interest speech would reflect a broader inclination to err
on the side of overextending free speech protection. 157 Better, though,
would be to avoid erring in either direction, through attending to the
basic reasons for constitutionally protecting speech in the first place.
In particular, as a matter of sheer logic, the courts cannot coherently
extend the free speech value of autonomous self-realization, self-
fulfillment, or self-perfection to encompass non-consensual and indeed
anti-consensual cyber harassment. No doubt typical cyber harassers are
following their impulses, or their pathologies. But if this harassing
behavior is claimed to manifest the self-realization justification for
protecting freedom of speech, 158 then the Free Speech Clause is
immediately thereby reduced to self-contradictory incoherence.
Virtually any verbal or non-verbal human behavior, however pointless,
destructive, seriously criminal, or even self-destructive, would on the
same inflated understanding also count as self-realizational speech for
constitutional purposes. And that would, contrary to the purposes of
the Free Speech Clause, obliterate any distinction between speech and
social behavior in general. The Free Speech Clause cannot meaningfully
amount to an incoherent free-behavior-by-everyone clause.159
Sensibly, advocates of autonomous self-realization as a basic free
speech justification have avoided any such mistake. Autonomous self-
realization cannot mean something like giving social vent to one's
impulses, hostile or otherwise. Consider the classic declaration by
Professor Thomas Emerson: "[F]reedom of expression is essential as a
means of assuring individual self-fulfillment. The proper end of man is
the realization of his character and potentialities as a human being. For
the achievement of this self-realization the mind must be free." 160
157 See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012) (deliberately lying about
having been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor); Brown v. Entm't Merch.'s
Ass'n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011) (limits on access by minors to particular violent video
games); United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 464 (2010) (including cases of so-called
"animal crush" videos); City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000) (commercial
barroom nude dancing as constitutional speech); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S.
560 (1991) (plurality opinion) (to similar effect as Erie, 529 U.S. 277). Of course, typical
cyber harassment cases may well involve harms much more severe and pervasive than
other sorts of literal speech.
158 For background, see the more sensibly limited and circumscribed understandings
of autonomous self-realization or self-development as articulated by the sources cited
supra note 124.
159 See supra note 125 (referencing sensible free speech purpose typologies).
160 THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6 (1970).
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Similarly, Professor Frederick Schauer, referring to the "self-
development" 161 free speech value, holds that
a person who uses his faculties to their fullest extent, who is all
that it is possible to be, is in some sense better off, and in an
Aristotelian sense happier, than those whose development is
stultified . . . . [I]t is the faculties of reason and thinking that are
at the core of self-development.162
Or as Professor Kent Greenawalt has observed, "freedom of discussion
is thought to promote independent judgment and considerate decision,
what might be characterized as autonomy." 163
This developmental, flourishing-oriented understanding of
autonomous self-actualization is classically embodied in Justice
Brandeis's claim that " [t] hose who won our independence believed that
the final end of the state was to make men free to develop their
faculties." 164 Of course at some level of detail, there will be
disagreements of emphasis in how the free speech value of autonomous
self-realization is to be precisely understood. But it is even clearer that
the mainstream discussions of this basic free speech value exclude, if
they do not also directly oppose, the literal speech activities typically
amounting to cyber harassment in its various forms.165
CONCLUSION
Cyber harassment in its various forms imposes substantial costs on
many persons. Those substantial costs, and their unequal distribution,
are plainly important in mobilizing support for legal and cultural
responses to cyber harassment. It is important to recognize, however,
that most forms and instances of cyber harassment do not implicate any
161 SCHAUER, supra note 125, at 54.
162 Id.; see also JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 121 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., 1974)
(1859) (seeking "the highest and most harmonious development of [personal] powers
to a consistent whole").
163 Greenawalt, supra note 125, at 143; see also Tsesis, supra note 125, at 1028 ("One
of the most often stated rationales for protecting free speech is society's obligation to
safeguard the right of thoughtful and articulate persons to communicatively exercise
their intellectual capacities").
164 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring),
overruled in part on other grounds by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969).
165 See supra Part II; Koppelman, supra note 57, at 667-72, 684-92. Professor
Koppelman discusses viewpoint-based restrictions on revenge porn, the proper scope of
categorical exceptions to protected speech, such as libel and obscenity, and most
importantly, revenge porn as actually impairing both the autonomous self-realization
and the democratic citizen-efficacy of the targets of the revenge porn in question. See id.
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of the commonly cited reasons for constitutionally protecting speech in
the first place. Where any such reasons are in fact implicated in the
cyber harassment cases, it is typically the meaningful autonomy and
self-realization interests of the targets, rather than those of the
harassers, that are at significant risk.
